STATE OF WSCONSIN Department of Employee Trust Funds<br>David A. Stella<br>SECRETARY

DATE: November 2, 2009
TO: Wisconsin Deferred Compensation Board
FROM: Shelly Schueller, Director
Wisconsin Deferred Compensation Program

## SUBJECT: FDIC Option Update

This memo is for the Board's information only. No action is required.
At the September 2, 2009, Deferred Compensation Investment Committee meeting and the May 19, 2009, Deferred Compensation Board (Board) meeting, members discussed the Wisconsin Deferred Compensation (WDC) Program's Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Option and the financial strength of the firm providing it, Marshall and IIsley (M\&I) Bank. Throughout the past year, the Department has continued to monitor M\&l Bank's financial health on behalf of the Board and WDC participants.

As of September 30, 2009, 3,867 participants held assets worth $\$ 78,202,640$ in the FDIC Option. There are eleven WDC participants with FDIC Option account balances over the federal insurance limit of $\$ 250,000$ and another thirty-one with balances greater than $\$ 200,000$. The amounts by which accounts exceed the federal insurance limit of \$250,000 range from $\$ 1,100$ to $\$ 85,000$. Each of these participants was contacted by the WDC via a personal letter in the spring of 2009, reminding them of the insurance limit and the other WDC investment options. Despite this direct contact, none of the participants have made any changes related to their WDC FDIC accounts.

In attempting to cope with the contractions in the economy, M\&I has experienced many of the same challenges as other financial institutions. This summer, the level of nonperforming loans in their book of business was deemed to be precariously high. Because M\&l traditionally reports all non-performing loans, even those less than 90 days late, the net result was a non-performing assets ratio of $7.5 \%$, which is greater than M\&l's peers. Consequently, the bank was included on a list of potentially troubled banks in August 2009 and Fitch Ratings gave the bank a "rating watch negative" designation in early September. As of the end of September 2009, M\&l's nonperforming loans represented 5.6\% of its total loans. A copy of the most recent Morningstar Stock Report for M\&l and three recent media publications on the bank are attached to this memo for your review.

| Board | Mtg Date | Item \# |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DC | $11 / 17 / 09$ | 10 |

$\overline{\text { Signature }} \overline{\text { Date }}$

FDIC Update
November 2, 2009
Page 2

If M\&I were to fail, the FDIC's standard procedures would likely be followed and another bank selected by the FDIC would assume control. Participants would have access to their account assets, up to the insured value of $\$ 250,000$, on the next business day. If the FDIC was unable to find a bank to assume responsibility, the FDIC would cut checks to all account holders, meaning that WDC assets would be available to participants in a few days. According to the FDIC, this has only happened a very few times in 2009. If the new bank only chooses to take over the insured portion of a failed bank, the amount on deposit over the $\$ 250,000$ insurance limit would be part of any receivership claims.

Department staff will continue keep an eye on the health of M\&l and will report back to the Board again if the bank's financial situation appears to deteriorate any further.

Attachments

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. Ml

2 Quote/Snapshot
3 Analyst Report
5 Financials
6 Valuation
7 Ownership
8 Annotated Snapshot

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. Ml

## Quote/Snapshot

| Morningstar Investment Style |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Style Breakdown |  |  |
| Value | Core | Growth |
| 河 |  |  |
| $\stackrel{\square}{2}$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |


| Profitability | 03/31/2009 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Stock | Industry | SGP 500 |
| ROA \% | -3.70 | -0.20 | 7.50 |
| ROE \% | -35.10 | -2.10 | 19.40 |
| Net Margin \% | -92.50 | -4.10 | 9.90 |
| Asset Turnover | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 |
| Fin Leverage | 9.90 | - | 4.80 |
| Sales/Employee 241.90 \$Thousands |  |  |  |


| Valuation 05/27/2009 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Stock | Industry | S\&P 500 |
| Price/Earnings | $\begin{array}{r} -0.70 \\ -144.9 \end{array}$ | -41.20 | 16.40 |
| Forward P/E | , | - | 13.50 |
| Price/Book | 0.30 | 15.90 | 3.50 |
| Price/Cash Flow | 2.40 | 87.00 | 9.20 |
| Price/Sales | 0.60 | 33.90 | 1.80 |
| Dividend YId \% | 10.90 | 3.40 | 3.00 |

Growth 12/31/2008

|  | $\% 1$ Yr | $\% 3$ Yr | S\&P 500 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Sales | 7.80 | 10.70 | 12.40 |
| Net Income | - | - | 11.70 |
| EPS | - | - | 13.10 |
| Equity/Share | -8.60 | 6.10 | 8.90 |
| Dividends | 5.80 | 10.90 | 15.00 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Morningstar Stock Grades |  |  |  |


| Growth | C |
| :--- | :--- |
| Profitability | D |
| Financial Health | D |


| Industry Peers |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mark | Cap \$Mil | TTM Sales \$Mil |
| Daiwa Securities |  | 88,634 | 4,251.30 |
| Fortis |  | 8,875 | 164,840.23 |
| The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd |  | 8,091 | 7,556.42 |
| M \& T Bank Corporation |  | 5,419 | 2,767.41 |
| People's United Financial, Inc. |  | 5,322 | 940.00 |
| Fund Ownership |  |  |  |
|  | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ | \% Share Held \% Fund Assets |  |
| American Funds Growth Fund of Amer $\mathrm{A} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star}$ |  | 2.77 | 0.09 |
| T. Rowe Price Equity Income | $\star \star \star \star$ | 1.31 | 0.16 |
| American Funds Fundamental Investors A | 大 $\star \star \star$ | 1.19 | 0.14 |
| Vanguard 500 Index Investor | $\star \star \star$ | 0.92 | 0.04 |
| Vanguard Mid Capitalization Index | $\star \star \star \star$ | 0.87 | 0.25 |


| Stock Type | Last Close Price | Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cyclical | $\$ 6.06(05 / 27 / 2009)$ | $\$ 14.00$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |


| Quick Stats |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Morningstar Style | Industry | Sector | Stock Type |
| Mid Value | Regional Banks | Financial Services | Cyclical |
| Price/Cash Flow | Price/Earnings | Price/Sales | Sales (\$Mil) |
| 2.40 | -0.70 | 0.60 | 2,466 |
| 52-Wk Range | Avg. Volume 6,118,147 | Yield | Market Cap (\$Mil) |
| 29.76-2.98 | (05/27/2009) | 10.90 | 1,610 |

## Performance





Earning Trends
Historical years use fiscal year-end \%

## Operations

## What Does This Company Do?

Based in Milwaukee, Marshall \& Ilsley has 370 branches scattered across seven major regions: Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Kansas City. The bulk of its branches, deposits, and loans are in its Wisconsin base. Overall, commercial, commercial real estate, and construction loans make up $74 \%$ of the bank's $\$ 49$ billion loan book.

| Contact Information |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Address |  |
|  | 770 North Water Street |
| Milwaukee, WI 53202 |  |
| Phone | $1414765-7700$ |
| Website | http://www.micorp.com |
| Direct Investment | No |
| Dividend Reinvestment | Yes |

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI

## Analysis

## Trailing One-Year Price



Analysis by Jason Ren 05/19/2009
Faced with a slow-growth home footprint, Marshall \& Ilsley pursued an aggressive expansion strategy in Arizona and Florida earlier this decade. Real estate markets in those asset-bubble states have since collapsed, leaving M\&I holding the bag on many soured construction and development (C\&D) bets. The bank's significant exposure to those states probably portends higher losses and potentially punitive government help. As such, we think an investment in M\&l is speculative. The largest bank based in Wisconsin, MGI built a reputation as a solid commercial lender through its conservative underwriting. Combined with a favorable economic environment, charge-offs as a percentage of loans held hovered around just $0.20 \%$ for much of the past two decades, even as M\&I was managing multiple geographies outside its upper Midwest base. Although we don't think underwriting standards deteriorated significantly, the impressive credit metrics may have lulled $\mathrm{M} \mathcal{I}$ into building up an unfavorable concentration of loans in Arizona and Florida. Of the bank's $\$ 49$ billion loan book, $20 \%$ is currently exposed to those weakened states. The composition of that exposure foreshadows steep losses to come. C\&D losses have increased across the United States. In the first quarter of 2009, 54\% of M\&I's $\$ 328$ million in net charge-offs came from deteriorated C\&D loans. Also, C\&D loans constitute nearly 24\% of the firm's Arizona and Florida loans. With 23\%, or \$545 million, of Arizona and Florida C\&D loans nonperforming, losses are sure to mount through the downturn. Should MEII's other footprints experience a recession approaching the scale of Arizona's and Florida's, the result could spell more trouble because C\&D makes up 17\% of the total loan book. Construction Ioans aren't our only concern. Commercial real estate (CRE) composes $26 \%$ of the bank's loans. According to nationwide data from the Federal Reserve and other sources, CRE losses haven't crested yet. We would not be surprised if M\&I became caught in a wave of CRE defaults as the recession continues. This unfavorable loan book concentration has persuaded management to take drastic steps to preserve capital. Among other initiatives, the dividend was cut to a penny, and executive bonuses were nixed for 2008. However, if losses keep climbing, more equity raises may be necessary. Prospects look bleak for M\&l as it works to control credit risk in this operating environment.

| Stock Type | Last Close Price | Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cyclical | $\$ 6.06(05 / 27 / 2009)$ | $\$ 14.00$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |

\$6.06 (05/27/2009) \$14.00

Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ $\star \star \star \star$

Analyst Note by Jason Ren 05/19/2009
Marshall \& Ilsley Ml announced that it has started a discretionary equity issuance of common stock to raise capital of about $\$ 350$ million. The shares will be sold though brokers' transactions, or at prevailing market prices. We have raised our fair value estimate, as our previous valuation baked in much steeper equity dilution. This equity raise through the capital markets makes it less likely that the company will have to resort to the Treasury for more equity in the future, but we caution that more capital could still be needed if M\&I's loans deteriorate toward our more bearish scenario.

| Valuation |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Fair Value Estimate | \$14.00 |
| Stock Price | \$7.40 |
| Consider Buying | 5.60 |
| Consider Selling | 35.00 |
| Uncertainty Risk | NA |
| Economic Moat | Narrow |
| Stewardship Grade | C |

We are raising our fair value estimate to $\$ 14$ per share from $\$ 11$ as we reconsider our previous equity dilution assumptions. MgI's assets fall short of the $\$ 100$ billion baseline for stress testing, and its equity issuance at market prices makes it probable that the firm will not have to go to the government for a second, more punitive helping of Troubled Asset Relief Program money. Our two scenarios, a base case and a worse case, are weighed equally. Security markdowns, net charge-offs, and equity raises are our main modeling drivers. We think the bank's nonagency paper will get marked down $\$ 111$ million in our base case and $\$ 275$ million in our worse case. M\&l's composition of construction and commercial real estate loans has us thinking that charge-offs could climb steeply higher in 2009, $3.92 \%$ in our base case and $6.51 \%$ in our worse case. MqI's \$350 million equity raise is enough to stay above the $4 \%$ Tier 1 common ratio in our base case, but it will need $\$ 250$ million more in our worse case. Assuming a $\$ 7$ share price, the anticipated equity raises are $16 \%$ dilutive in our base case and $25 \%$ dilutive in our worse case. Both assumptions assume a net interest margin of around $3.1 \%$ and bake in a $10.5 \%$ cost of common equity. III

## Other Opinions

## Bulls Say

- Historically, state-by-state population growth doesn't get much better than Arizona and Florida. Should real estate markets bounce back, M\&II has reasonable footprints in those states.
- Stability in its Wisconsin base should help buoy M\&l as it works through problem loans in Arizona and Florida.


## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI

Analysis continued

## Stock Type

 Last Close Price Fair Value Est
## Bears Say

- M\&I doesn't have an attractive mix of low-cost deposits, which pares down its net interest margin.
- Together, construction and commercial real estate make up 43\% of the bank's loan book. Continuing credit deterioration in those loan buckets portends more pain for shareholders and may force an equity raise.
- M\&l has cut its quarterly common dividend to a penny while it works to build up its capital cushion.


## Additional Commentary 05/19/2009

## Growth

We doubt M\&I will pursue sizable acquisitions while credit quality remains questionable. In our base case, we think assets and net revenue will increase at annual average rates of $3.6 \%$ and $2.5 \%$, respectively, through 2013.

## Profitability

Its appetite for construction loans sank M\&I's return on equity into the red in 2008. With more construction and commercial real estate losses to come, we don't think M\&I's return on equity will match its cost of equity in our five-year forecast period.

## Financial Health

M§I has historically been less leveraged than its peers and received TARP money in late 2008. Credit losses could force the company to raise more equity in the future.
\$6.06 (05/27/2009) \$14.00
Cyclical

Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ $\star \star \star \star$

## Profile

Based in Milwaukee, Marshall \& Ilsley has 370 branches scattered across seven major regions: Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Kansas City. The bulk of its branches, deposits, and loans are in its Wisconsin base. Overall, commercial, commercial real estate, and construction loans make up $74 \%$ of the bank's $\$ 49$ billion loan book.

## Strategy

Presently, M\&II is focused on internally expanding its wealth-management enterprise and its core banking services. Non-government-assisted acquisitions will be off the table until the company's credit outlook improves.

## Management

CEO Mark Furlong has helmed MÉl since early 2007, replacing Dennis Kuester who remained the bank's chairman. Although we're not fans of the bank's previous expansion efforts, we think management is trying to right the ship through paring construction exposure, cutting the dividend, and nixing executive bonuses. We also maintain that management owns an the dividend, and nixing executive bonuses. We also maintain that management owns an
adequate level of stock--4\% of common shares outstanding--to align its interests with other shareholders'. However, several factors detract from the company's Stewardship Grade. In our opinion, the bank's annual and quarterly earnings disclosures aren't as lucid as they should be. Additionally, a couple of the bank's directors are too richly compensated for their consulting services provided to the bank, with perks that include club dues and the use of company vehicles. Those demerits lower our Stewardship Grade for M\&I to a C.

## Risk

Myl faces many risks through the downturn. C\&D and CRE loans compose 43\% of Myl's loan book and are projected to become the next major loss categories for U.S. banks as residential losses slow. With a good deal of C\&D and CRE exposure in Arizona and Florida, losses will probably continue to multiply as asset bubbles in those states are unwound. ook.
.
los

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI

## Financials



Financials

| Revenue \$Mil | $2,578.49$ | $2,981.49$ | $3,405.72$ | $2,345.28$ | $2,528.83$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Gross Margin \% | - | - | - | - | - |
| Oper Income \$Mil | - | - | - | - | - |
| Operating Margin \% | - | - | - | - | - |
| Net Income \$Mil | 627.09 | 727.47 | 807.84 | $1,150.94$ | $-2,043.46$ |
| Earnings Per Share | 2.77 | 3.10 | 3.17 | 1.87 | -7.92 |
| Dividends \$ | 0.81 | 0.93 | 1.05 | 1.20 | 1.27 |
| Shares Mil | 226 | 234 | 254 | 265 | 259 |
| Book Value Per Share \$ | 17.41 | 19.86 | 24.11 | 26.30 | 24.04 |
| Oper Cash Flow \$Mil | $1,007.43$ | 645.06 | 844.90 | 953.54 | 796.55 |
| Cap Spending \$Mil | 296.01 | 375.62 | 365.85 | 415.04 | 101.66 |
| Free Cash Flow \$Mil | 65.97 | -50.53 | -675.72 | 269.58 | $-1,270.91$ |

## Profitability

| Return on Assets \% | 1.68 | 1.68 | 1.58 | 1.98 | -3.37 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Return on Equity \% | 17.37 | 17.00 | 14.93 | 17.46 | -30.94 |
| $\quad$ Net Margin \% | 24.32 | 24.40 | 23.72 | 49.07 | -80.81 |
| Asset Turnover | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Assets/Equity | 10.40 | 9.90 | 9.14 | 8.51 | 9.96 |

## Financial Health

| Working Capital \$Mil | - | - | - | - | - |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Long Term Debt \$Mil | $5,026.60$ | $6,668.67$ | $8,026.16$ | $8,207.41$ | $9,613.72$ |
| Total Equty \$Mil | $3,889.81$ | $4,667.81$ | $6,151.37$ | 7,033 | 6,260 |
| Debt/Equity | 1.29 | 1.43 | 1.30 | 1.17 | 1.54 |


| Stock Type | Last Close Price | Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cyclical | $\$ 6.06(05 / 27 / 2009)$ | $\$ 14.00$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |


| Balance Sheet |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assets \$Mil |  | 2007 | 2008 | Current |
| Loans (Gross) |  | 46,296.26 | 49,984.55 | 49,984.55 |
| Less: Allowances |  | 496.19 | 1,202.17 | 1,202.17 |
| Net Loans |  | 45,800.07 | 48,782.38 | 48,782.38 |
| Securities |  | 7,826.06 | 7,668.56 | 7,668.56 |
| Trading Assets |  | 124.61 | 518.36 | 518.36 |
| Intangibles |  | 1,807.96 | 763.45 | 763.45 |
| Other |  | 4,289.90 | 4,603.67 | 4,603.67 |
| Total Assets |  | 59,848.60 | 62,336.42 | 62,336.42 |
| Liabilities and Stockholder's Equity \$Mil |  |  |  |  |
| Deposits |  | 35,191.35 | 41,023.14 | 41,023.14 |
| Short Term Debt |  | 8,476.38 | 2,868.03 | 2,868.03 |
| Long Term Debt |  | 8,207.41 | 9,613.72 | 9,613.72 |
| Other |  | 940.73 | 2,571.35 | 2,571.35 |
| Preferred Stock |  | 0.00 | 1.72 | 1.72 |
| Total Liabilities |  | 52,815.87 | 56,076.24 | 56,076.24 |
| Total Stockholder's Equity |  | 7,032.73 | 6,260.18 | 6,260.18 |
| Total Liabilities \& Equity |  | 59,848.60 | 62,336.42 | 62,336.42 |
| Quarterly Results |  |  |  |  |
| Sales | 06/2008 | 09/2008 | 12/2008 | 03/2009 |
| Current | 635.00 | 624.00 | 628.00 | 578.00 |
| \% Change From Year Earlier | 8.20 | 6.50 | 0.90 | -9.80 |
| Net Income |  |  |  |  |
| Current | -394.00 | 83.00 | -1,879.00 | -92.00 |
| \% Change From Year Earlier | - | -62.20 | - | - |
| Earnings/Share |  |  |  |  |
| Current | -1.52 | 0.32 | -7.29 | -0.44 |
| \% Change From Year Earlier | - | -61.40 | - | - |

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI

## Valuation/Estimates

| Valuation Ratios |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Stock | Industry | S¢P 500 | *Stock's 5 Yr Average |
| Price/Earnings | -0.70 | -41.20 | 16.40 | - |
| Price/Book | 0.30 | 15.90 | 3.50 | 1.7 |
| Price/Sales | 0.60 | 33.90 | 1.80 | 3.0 |
| Price/Cash Flow | 2.40 | 87.00 | 9.20 | - |
| Dividend Yld \% | 10.90 | 3.40 | 3.00 | - |
| * Price/Cash Flow uses 3-year average. |  |  |  |  |
| Forward Valuation Ratios |  | Stock | Industry | S\&P 500 |
| Forward Price/Earnings |  | -144.90 | - | 13.50 |
| PEG Ratio |  | 2.10 | - | 2.20 |
| PEG Payback (Yrs) |  | - | - | - |

## Earnings Surprises \%

By what percentage did the company beat concensus analyst earnings estimates?

|  | 33.3 |  | 85.3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -3.2 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | -2,683.3 |  |
| 06/2008 | 09/2008 | 12/2008 | 03/2009 |

Range of Analyst Opinions
Total number of Analysts: 16


Current Rates of Return \%


| Stock Type | Last Close Price | Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cyclical | $\$ 6.06(05 / 27 / 2009)$ | $\$ 14.00$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |



## Annual Earnings Estimates



## Analyst Opinion Trends



# Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI 

| Ownership | Stock Type | Last Close Price |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |  |
| $\star \star \star \star$ |  |  |


| Fund Ownership Summary |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Shares Outstanding | Fund Ownership | Total of Funds | Average Star Rating |
| $267,000,000.00$ | $50,730,000.00$ | 274.00 | - |

Insider Activity
Date Name/Position

05/21/2009 Chait Jon F/Director
05/21/2009 Chait Jon F/Director
05/11/2009 Benschoter Ann M./Senior Vice President
05/11/2009 Deneen Ryan R/SVP and Dir. of Corp. Tax
05/11/2009 Ellis Thomas Robert/Senior Vice President
05/11/2009 Erickson Randy J/SVP, Chief Admin. Off.
05/11/2009 Furlong Mark F/President and CEO
05/11/2009 Hogan Mark R/Sr. VP and Chief Credit Off.
05/11/2009 Justiliano Patricia R/SVP and Corporate Controller
05/11/2009 Kelly Brent J/SVP and Dir. of Corp. Mark.
05/11/2009 Knickerbocker Beth D/SVP and Chief Risk Officer
05/11/2009 Krei Kenneth C/Senior Vice President
05/11/2009 Oneill Thomas J/wi//Senior Vice President
05/11/2009 Renard Paul J/SVP and Dir. of Human Resource
05/11/2009 Roberts John L/Senior Vice President
05/11/2009 Root Thomas A/SVP and Audit Director
05/11/2009 Smith Gregory A/SVP \& Chief Financial Officer
05/11/2009 Smith Michael C/SVP and Treasurer
05/11/2009 Smith Ronald E/Senior Vice President
05/01/2009 Chait Jon F/Director

Shares
10,000
1,000
19,620
11,975
32,30
32,528
105,530
21,444
11,975
8,953
17,327
33,023
34,145
20,219
27,083
8,953
36,290
11,975
25,417
1,080

Transaction
Acquired at \$6.50/Share.
Acquired at \$6.61/Share.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 19,620 Shares. Acquisition (including grants/awards) 11,975 Shares

Acquisition (including grants/awards) 32,301 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 32,528 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 105,530 Shares. Acquisition (including grants/awards) 21,444 Shares.

Acquisition (including grants/awards) 11,975 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 8,953 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 17,327 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 33,023 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 34,145 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 20,219 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 27,083 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 8,953 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 36,290 Shares.
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 11,975 Shares
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 25,417 Shares
Acquisition (including grants/awards) 1,080 Shares.

| Fund Name | \% |  |  | Chng(000) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ | Shares Held | \% Fund <br> Assets | Ownrshp | Date of Portfolio |
| American Funds Growth Fund of Amer $\boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| T. Rowe Price Equity Income American Funds Fundamental Investors A | $\star \star \star \star$ | 1.31 | 0.16 | 500.00 | 03/31/2009 |
|  | $\star \star \star \star$ | 1.19 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Vanguard 500 Index Investor | $\star \star \star$ | 0.92 | 0.04 | -19.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Vanguard Mid Capitalization Index | $\star \star \star \star$ | 0.87 | 0.25 | 144.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Columbia Mid Cap Value Z | $\star \star \star \star$ | 0.80 | 0.40 | 721.00 | 03/31/2009 |
| Vanguard Total Stock Mkt Idx | $\star \star \star$ | 0.74 | 0.03 | 166.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Lord Abbett Affiliated A | *** | 0.64 | 0.23 | 354.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Nicholas | $\star \star \star$ | 0.62 | 0.89 | 200.00 | 03/31/2009 |
| Vanguard Institutional Index | * $\star \star$ | 0.60 | 0.04 | 54.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Heartland Value Plus | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | 0.34 | 1.75 | 900.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Wells Fargo Advantage Opportunity Inv $\boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star} \boldsymbol{\star}$ |  | 0.31 | 0.55 | 821.00 | 01/31/2009 |
| DWS Growth \& Income S <br> Wells Fargo Advantage Common Stoc Inv | 大 $\star$ | 0.30 | 0.25 | 807.00 | 03/31/2009 |
|  | $\star \star \star \star$ | 0.28 | 0.74 | 70.00 | 01/31/2009 |
| Eaton Vance Tax-Mgd Growth 1.0 | $\star \star \star \star$ | 0.24 | 0.08 |  | 12/31/2008 |
| Eaton Vance Tax-Mgd Growth 1.1 A | $\star \star \star$ | 0.24 | 0.08 |  | 12/31/2008 |
| Eaton Vance Tax-Mgd Growth 1.2 A | * $\star$ | 0.24 | 0.08 |  | 12/31/2008 |
| Fidelity Spartan U.S. Equity Index Inv | $\star \star \star$ | 0.23 | 0.02 | 12.00 | 03/31/2009 |
| DFA U.S. Large Cap Value I | * | 0.21 | 0.16 | -6.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| T. Rowe Price Growth \& Income | * $\star$ * | 0.20 | 0.40 |  | 03/31/200 |


| Top Funds Owners Largest Concentration |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fund Name | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \% \\ \text { Shares } \\ \text { Held } \end{array}$ | \% Fund Assets | Chng(000) <br> Ownrshp | Date of Portfolio |
| Harbor SMID Value Instl | - | 0.00 | 2.16 |  | 03/31/2009 |
| Heartland Value Plus | $\star$ | 0.34 | 1.75 | 900.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| Sterling Capital Small Cap Value I | $\star \star \star$ | 0.01 | 1.54 |  | 03/31/2009 |
| Optique Large Cap Value | $\star \star \star$ | 0.01 | 1.50 | -9.00 | 12/31/2008 |
| DWS Disciplined Long/Short Value Instl- |  | 0.01 | 1.49 | 21.00 | 03/31/2009 |
| Thompson Plumb MidCap First American Small Cap Growth Opp Y |  | 0.00 | 1.36 |  | 03/31/2009 |
|  |  | 0.07 | 1.27 | 190.00 | 03/31/2009 |
| Undiscovered Mgrs Behavioral Value Inst | $\star \star \star$ | 0.02 | 1.10 | 16.00 | 03/31/2009 |

## Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. MI

Appendix: Annotated Snapshot

| Valuation 05/27/2009 |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Stock | Industry | S\&P 500 |
| Price/Earnings | -0.70 | -41.20 | 16.40 |
| Forward P/E | -144.9 | - | 13.50 |
| Price/Book | 0 | 15.90 | 3.50 |
| Price/Cash Flow | 0.30 | 87.00 | 9.20 |
| Price/Sales | 2.40 | 33.90 | 1.80 |
| Dividend Yld \% | 0.60 | 3.40 | 3.00 |

This stock's price/sales ratio is fairly normal compared with the broader market, but it is quite a bit higher than most other stocks in its industry. A lower price/sales is normally preferable to a higher one, but factors such as better future growth prospects can justify a higher number. Price/sales can be a useful measure when figures such as price/earnings are not available, but it is not the most reliable valuation measure, so you should check other valuation measures as well

| Growth $12 / 31 / 2008$ |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | $\% 1 \mathrm{Yr}$ | $\% 3 \mathrm{Yr}$ | S\&P 500 |
| Sales | 7.80 | 10.70 | 12.40 |
| Net Income | - | - | 11.70 |
| EPS | - | - | 13.10 |
| Equity/Share | -8.60 | 6.10 | 8.90 |
| Dividends | 5.80 | 10.90 | 15.00 |

Most stocks in the regional banks industry have seen steadily growing revenue and earnings over the past three years. This stock has also seen steady revenue growth over the past three years.

| Profitability |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Stock | Industry | S\&P 500 |
| ROA \% | -3.70 | -0.20 | 7.50 |
| ROE \% | -35.10 | -2.10 | 19.40 |
| Net Margin \% | -92.50 | -4.10 | 9.90 |
| Asset Turnover | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.90 |
| Fin Leverage | 9.90 | - | 4.80 |
| Sales/Employee | 241.90 | - | - |
| \$Thousands |  |  |  |

Over the long haul, this company has posted results that are about average for its industry, though its ROA over the most recent trailing 12 months was very low. Note also that the company has had very low profit margins, another key profitability measure.

## Morningstar Investment Style

Style Breakdown


This stock's industry peers tend to fall in or around the small-cap value area of the Morningstar style box. Like it's peers, Marshall \& Ilsley Corp. has a value orientation, except

| Stock Type | Last Close Price | Fair Value Est | Morningstar Rating ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cyclical | $\$ 6.06(05 / 27 / 2009)$ | $\$ 14.00$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |

it has a much more extreme value bias than its peers. Also, it differs in that it is a mid-cap issue. Note that value stocks are often less volatile than growth issues, unless the stock shows value characteristics because it is facing serious business or financial problems.


This stock is in the regional banks industry, which has generated market-like results over the longer 10 year period, but has really suffered the past five. What's really discouraging, though, is that compared to its industry peers, this stock has been one of the worst performers over the past five years (10-year returns are unavailable). Keep in mind when looking at a stock or industry's record that historic returns are not necessarily a predictor of future performance. Persistent strength or weakness, however, may very well say something about the structure of an industry or quality of a company's management.


Expectations are that this company will lose money this year. You should investigate why this is and how management plans to turn the company around.

