

SWIB Update

ETF Board Meeting March 26, 2020 David Villa, Executive Director/Chief Investment Officer Edwin Denson, Managing Director, Asset & Risk Allocation Brian Hellmer, Managing Director, Global Public Market Strategies

> STATE OF WISCONSIN INVESTMENT BOARD

Performance Outlook & Covid-19 Outbreak



2019 CTF 5-Year Return Decomposed



Source: SWIB; 7.8% is the geometric average realized return, 2015 to 2019; Gross of Fee.

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2020 CTF 5-Year Return - ?



Source: SWIB; 5-year Annualized Return is forecast using NEPC assumptions for 2020; Gross of Fee.



Asset Class Expected Performance

Asset Class	December, 2019 Expected 5-7 year return forecast for 2020*	March, 2020 Expected 5-7 year return forecast
US Equities	6.0%-6.3%	
Non-US Equities (unhedged)	6.8%	
Investment Grade Credit	4.0%	
High Yield Credit	5.3%	
US Treasuries	2.5%	

*Source: NEPC expected returns are annualized averages expected over the next 5 to 7 years.



Benchmark Index Performance

Safe-haven assets fare well in Q1.

Summary of Returns February 29, 2020					
Benchmark Indices (% change, annualized)	YTD	1 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr	10 Yr Volatility
CTF Policy Benchmark (Gross of Fee)	-3.0%	8.6%	6.3%	7.9%	7.4%
S&P 500	-8.3%	8.2%	9.2%	12.7%	12.7%
Russell 2000	-11.4%	-4.9%	5.1%	10.4%	17.2%
MSCI ACWI Gross	-9.0%	4.5%	6.1%	8.7%	13.4%
MSCI ACWI Gross (Local)	-8.1%	5.5%	6.7%	9.6%	11.5%
MSCI World ex US Equities	-10.6%	-0.4%	2.0%	4.7%	14.6%
MSCI World ex US Equities (Local)	-8.8%	1.4%	2.9%	6.4%	11.4%
MSCI Emerging Markets	-9.7%	-1.9%	2.7%	3.2%	17.2%
Barclays Capital Govt/Credit	4.5%	13.4%	3.9%	4.2%	3.4%
BOFA ML High Yield	-1.5%	5.9%	5.2%	7.1%	5.8%
Citigroup World Govt Bonds	2.6%	8.2%	2.9%	2.1%	5.3%
Citigroup World Govt Bonds (Hedged)	3.9%	10.9%	4.0%	4.2%	3.0%

Source: FactSet, SWIB; CTF Benchmark return is preliminary.



Exposure Management Process

Exploit near-term opportunities and manage valuation risk.





COVID-19 Outbreak

Outline for Discussion

- 1. Current Situation
 - Spread outside China up sharply
 - Tens or hundreds of millions of infections a possibility in 2020
- 2. Past Comparisons
 - More transmissible than other new diseases of the past decade
 - Deaths per infection: less deadly than SARS, more than seasonal flu
- 3. What will stop COVID-19?
 - Containment measures are the only immediate line of defense
 - A vaccine could be a year or even years away, antivirals months away
- 4. Economic Effects
 - Equity markets seem to have been pricing a SARS-like quick rebound
 - Impact on global activity likely to play out over several quarters



Current Situation

Ex-China cases are just getting started.

- Ex-China cases are growing exponentially, with many more cases likely over coming weeks.
- Experts think that, absent effective nonpharma containment measures, infections this year could reach into the tens or hundreds of millions globally.
- Stress to healthcare systems may be severe.





Past Comparisons

More transmissible than SARS, and in a more integrated economy.



- Less deadly than SARS as measured by deaths per infection, but more transmissible.
 - China is much more closely integrated into the global economy than was the case during the 2003 SARS outbreak.



Source: FactSet

What will stop COVID-19?

Non-pharmaceutical containment





Source: Fong et al, "Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza in Nonhealthcare Settings—Social Distancing Measures," Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, 26(50), 2020.

- Quarantines, travel restrictions, business closures, other prudent "social distancing" are the only immediate line of defense.
- New or, more likely, repurposed existing antivirals might be able to help slow transmission on a timeline of months.
- A vaccine could be a year or even years away, and even then there are
 questions of how quickly production could be scaled.



Economic Effects

A sharp V-shaped rebound unlikely.

Until about 21-Feb, equity markets seem to have been pricing a SARS-like outcome, limited to Asia and with quick economic rebound.



An extended period of quarantine and business closures in China will have ramifications far outside its borders, due to

- (i) its demand for goods & services of multinational firms,
- (ii) its supply of inputs to production of firms outside China, or
- (iii) its role as a final assembly location for many goods sold worldwide, and especially in the tech sector.



Risk and Opportunity: 2 Sides of the Coin

Specific sectors may gain, even during crisis.

Sector	Expected Losses	Potential Gains
Consumer Discretionary	(Leisure) Cruise ship bookings will be impacted for an extended period.	(Autos) Disruptions to public transit during crisis may nudge new consumers toward car ownership.
Technology	(Hardware) Following Trump tariffs, there is now even more incentive to diversify supply chains away from China.	(Software) Global Software sector outperformed Hardware by more than 6% mid-January to mid-February. Recurring revenue streams fare better during crises.
Materials	Disruption to China's industrial activity created an air pocket in global demand.	Steel and Aluminum producers outside China may actually benefit by satisfying demand that China (a net exporter of these products) cannot.

Source: SWIB Analysts



Context on pandemics, epidemics, & new disease outbreaks

•COVID-19 is proving to be considerably more infectious than SARS, MERS, and 2009 avian flu although less deadly to those infected.

•The deaths per infection rate is likely to fall from the current naïve ~3%, maybe to as low as 0.5%.

•This would still be 10x more deadly than seasonal flu.

•The combination of infectiousness and greater-than-flu fatality rate is worrisome.

[Pandemics in blue]									
Event	Viral type	Dates	Infections*	World excess deaths*	Infections as % world population		per	World population	Sources
1729 Russian flu	?	1729-1732		400,000		0.05%		803,000,000	[0]
1781 China flu	?	1781-82		800,000		0.08%		997,973,306	[0]
1830 China Flu	?	1830-1833	252,026,179	900,000	22.5%	0.08%	0.36%	1,120,116,353	[0]
1889 Russian flu	H3N8	Dec-1889/Mar-1890	714,285,714	1,000,000	42.7%	0.06%	0.14%	1,671,000,000	[7]
1918-20 Spanish Flu	H1N1	Jan-1918/Dec-1920	500,000,000	50,000,000	27.0%	2.70%	10.0%	1,849,985,396	CDC & [1]
1957-58 Asian Flu	H2N2	Feb-1957/Oct-1958	733,333,333	1,100,000	25.1%	0.038%			CDC, WHO, & [
1968 Hong Kong Flu	H3N2	Jul-1968/1970	666,666,667	1,000,000	18.8%	0.028%	0.15%	3,551,599,127	CDC, WHO
Avian Flu	H5N1	May-1997/Apr-2015	907	483	0.000014%	0.000007%	53.3%	6,623,517,833	[5]
SARS	SARS-CoV	Nov-2002/Jul-2003	8,096	774	0.000127%	0.000012%	9.6%	6,381,185,114	CDC
2009 Swine Flu	H1N1/09	Mar-2009/Dec-2009	943,000,000	188,600	13.7%	0.002744%	0.02%	6,872,767,093	[4], [4a], [4b], [4
MERS	MERS-CoV	2012/2019	2,494	858	0.000034%	0.000012%	34.4%	7,295,290,765	WHO
2019 COVID-19	SARS-CoV-2	Dec-19-Now	209,839	8,778	0.002692%	0.000113%	4.2%	7,794,798,739	WHO
Seasonal flu	Varies	1999-2015	1,000,000,000	468,538	14.9%	0.006987%	0.05%	6,705,946,610	WHO & [6]
Memoranda:									
Ebola	EBOV	Dec-2013/Mar-2016	28,646	11,323	0.0004%	0.000153%	39.5%	7,379,797,139	[3]
AIDS	HIV	2006 [Peak mortality]		1,950,000		0.029441%		6,623,517,833	ÎĤME
AIDS	HIV	2017 Mortality		950,000		0.012586%		7,547,858,925	IHME
AIDS	HIV	1997 [Peak new infections]	3,300,000		0.0559%			5,905,045,788	IHME
AIDS	HIV	2018 New infections	1,700,000		0.0223%			7,631,091,040	IHME
physician-confirmed case by statistical methods. Sta	counts [e.g., lab o tistical estimates o	tably, deaths & infections differ by r lab+symptom], and [2] high-case depend on records of mortality du tes: midpoint estimates with fairly	or pandemic ever to respiratory pro	nts, for which both oblems, in excess o	death & case co	unts are estimat	ed ex post		

 [0] Potter, "A history of influenza," Journal of Applied Microbiology 2001, 91, 572-579.

 [1] Johnson & Mueller, "Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918–1920 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic," Bull. Hist. Med., 2002 76: 105-115.

 [2] Vibcud et al, "Global Mortality Impact of the 1957-1959 Influenza Pandemic," Journal of Infectious Diseases, 2016:213.

 [3] Coltart et al, "The Ebola outbreak 2013-16: old lessons for new epidemics," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 372: 20160297.

 [4] Simonsen et al, "Global Mortality Estimates for the 2009 Influenza Pandemic from the GLaMOR Project: a Modeling Study," PLoS Med 10(11), 2013.

 [4] Van Kherkove et al, "Estimating age-specific cumulative incidence for the 2009 influenza pandemic: a meta-analysis of A(H1N1)pdm09 serological studies from 19 countries," Influenza Journal January 2013.

Global infections ~943 mn based on case fatality rates from 19 countries: Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Reunion Island, Singapore, UK, US, Vietnam.

[4b] Wong et al, "Case fatality risk of influenza A(H1N1pdm09): a systematic review", Epidemiology, November 2013 24[6].

[4c] Kelly, "The classical definition of a pandemic is not elusive," Bulletin of the WHO, 2011: 89:54:541.

[5] Lai et al, "Global epidemiology of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection in humans, 1997 – 2015: a systematic review," Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2016 July 16(7).
 [6] Iuliano et al, "Estimates of global seasonal influenza-associated respiratory mortality: a modelling study," Lancet. 2018 March 31; 391(10127): 1285–1300.

[10] unano et al, "Stantates or global seasonal influenza-associated respiratory mortanty: a modelling study, Lancet, 2016 March 31, 391(10127), 1260–17 [7] Valleron et al, "Transmissibility and geographic spread of the 1889 influenza pandemic," PNAS 2010 107(19).



2019 Recap: Performance & Costs 2020 Asset Allocation



2019 Performance - Core Fund

Gross of fees as of Dec. 31, 2019

19.9%

Benchmark: 19.2% Net Excess Value Added (NEVA): \$375.2 Million



7.8% Benchmark: 7.5% NEVA \$553.8 Million

<u> 10-Year</u>

8.6% Benchmark: 8.1% NEVA \$1.9 Billion



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NEVA: Net excess value added is the excess dollar return a portfolio earns above its benchmark and after all fees & costs.

2019 Performance – Variable Fund

Gross of fees as of December 31, 2019



Benchmark: 28.3% NEVA:\$13.4 Million



Benchmark: 9.7% NEVA: \$6.5 Million

10-Year 11.2%

Benchmark: 11.0% NEVA: \$58.5 Million



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NEVA: Net excess value added is the excess dollar return a portfolio earns above its benchmark and after all fees & costs.

Performance vs. 60/40 Reference Portfolio*

December 1999 to December 2019



- Core Trust Fund
 Return outperforms
 the 60/40 Reference
 Portfolio Return by
 25% (cumulative)
 over a 20 year time
 period.
- Based on CTF market
 value as of
 December 1999
 assuming no
 contribution or
 withdrawals, this
 equates to \$37.2
 billion excess value
 added above the
 Reference Portfolio.



*Fixed Income component of the Reference Portfolio changed from WGBI (global) to Bloomberg Barclays Gov't/Credit (domestic) following the October 2019 Board Workshop.

**Based on CTF market value as of December 1999 assuming no contributions or withdrawals.

Core Fund Asset Allocation Targets 2020



Totals exceed 100% due to SWIB's overall leverage of Core Fund assets. SWIB's actual asset allocation may vary up to +/- 6% from the targets shown above.



Variable Fund Asset Allocation Targets 2020





Core Fund Policy Portfolio

Broad Opportunity Set with Policy & Economic Leverage

Asset Class	Dec 31, 2019	Dec 31, 2009
Public Equity	49.0%	55.3%
Public Fixed Income	24.5%	27.0%
Inflation Sensitive	15.5%	3.0%
Multi Asset	4.0%	4.0%
Real Estate	8.0%	4.0%
Private Equity	9.0%	6.7%
Cash	0.0%	0.0%
Economic Leverage	-5.5%	0.0%
Hedge Funds, Alpha Overlay	5.5%	0.0%
Policy Leverage	<u>-10.0%</u>	<u>0.0%</u>
Total	100%	100%
EQ / FI Factor Allocation	64% / 46%	66% / 34%

Source: Dec 2019 Board Meeting, Dec 2019 Exposure Report, Dec 2009 AASPE Report



SWIB Saved \$1.3 Billion vs. Peers

2009-2018

SWIB's cost savings advantage has declined in recent years as more of our peers have started adopting our lower cost approach, including more internal management.



*This analysis compares SWIB's savings vs. the peer group median costs for every \$100 under management and multiplies that average savings by SWIB's median assets under management.



Internal Management Is Cost Effective

SWIB's cost for internal active management is multiples lower than the cost for external management.

2018

Public Market Asset Type (active strategies)	Internal Mgmt Cost (bps)	External Mgmt Cost (bps)
Global Large Cap Equity	12.0	60.4
Small Cap Equity	17.0	60.1*
Gov't/Credit Domestic Fixed Income	8.2	13.8
Global Fixed Income	8.5	30.9*

* External costs represent the median cost for SWIB's CEM public fund peers for asset classes that SWIB does not manage externally

Data source: CEM Benchmarking, Inc. 2018 Report 100 bps equals 1 percent



Advanced Degrees of SWIB Staff As of 11/30/2019

Degree Type	# of Employees
Masters of Business Administration (MBA)	55
Masters Degree other than MBA	36
Juris Doctor Degree (JD)	8
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)	7
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)	56
Certified Public Accountant (CPA)	20
TOTAL ACCREDITATIONS	182



Market Review



Global Equities - Performance

Virus concerns impact Q1.

03/20/2020

Local Equity Performance





Earnings Growth

Source: FactSet

Evolving growth forecasts remain positive for US and EM.





Global Bonds

Yields are volatile in Q1 due to COVID concerns and liquidity.



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Credit Sectors

Spreads have widened in Q1.



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Currency Performance

Emerging currencies have weakened in Q1.



Source: Bloomberg, DXY Index, JPM Emerging Markets Currency Index (Inverted)



U.S. Inflation

Source: Bloomberg

Inflation expectations markedly lower.



US 5 Year Breakeven Inflation

Updated: 03/20/2020



Volatility

Virus impacts both global supply chains and demand.

03/20/2020



Source: FactSet, Merrill Lynch MOVE, CBOE VIX, Euro Stoxx 50 VSTOXX



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